

A Demand-Response Framework in Balance Groups through Direct Battery-Storage Control

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Demand Response in Residential Buildings



- **Recently, we observe**

- A constant increase in the number of battery storage systems.
 - A need for larger absorption rates of renewable energy

- **We need:**

- to incentivize users to provide “*flexibility*”
 - to effectively *coordinate* flexibility extraction

Demand-Response Approaches

- **Commitment-based approaches**

- The users commit to *reduce load* during peak-hours
- The operator *distributes* the desired aggregated demand to the users
(e.g., Ruiz et al (2009), Chen et al. (2014))

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- **Incentive-based approaches:**

- The users provide *preferences* over availability and cost functions
- The operator computes optimal flexibility extraction that *minimize cost*
(e.g., Herter (2007), Triki & Violi (2009), Xu et al (2016))

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- **Combination of the two (*demand-response aggregation*)**

- The operator *directly* extracts flexibility when necessary
- In return, the operator offers to the owners a compensation
(e.g., Parvania et al (2013), Iria et al (2017), Nan et al (2018))


Demand-Response Aggregation: *Requirements & Objective*

- *Features/requirements:*

- optimizing *flexibility* extraction
- optimizing over a *future time horizon*
- optimizing over *multiple households*

- *Objective*

- Respond to *load reduction/increase goals*
- Participate in a *wholesale* electricity spot-market (e.g., Day-ahead, Intra-day)




Demand-Response Aggregation: *State-of-the-art & Challenges*

- So far, *analysis*

- is primarily restricted to *single* households
(e.g., Mohsenian-Rad (2016), He et al (2016), Jiang & Power (2016))
- includes *detailed modeling* of the battery and cycle costs
(e.g., He et al (2016))
- has taken into account *uncertainty* and *imperfect forecasts*
(e.g., Jiang & Power (2016))

- *Challenges*,

- *computationally efficient* methods for a coordinated response of a pool of battery-storage systems
- *dynamic-programming scheduling problem* with equilibrium constraints



Setup and Goal of this paper


- *Austrian market organization*
 - *balance-group* (BG) organization
 - every prosumer is part of a BG
 - feed-in and off-take are *cleared* in 15min

- *Incentives for strategic behavior*

- (O1) *Market participation*: The BG may exchange electricity in a spot-market
- (O2) *Imbalance optimization*: Reduce current imbalances to zero, or generate imbalances

- *Goal* of this paper:

- *formalize* these two (instantaneous) optimization problems
- *provide building blocks* for a large scale *dynamic* optimization



Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Energy Potential
- 3 Activation Costs
- 4 Centralized Optimal Activation
- 5 Summary & Future Work

Outline

1 Introduction


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Energy Potential



Energy Potential


Energy potential or flexibility of a household i , for a time interval ΔT , is defined as the amount of energy that can be “*charged*” to or “*discharged*” from the household.

- **Charging (power) potential:**

$$V_{c,i}(t) \doteq \overline{P_{g,i}}(t) - P_{g,i}(t) \geq 0$$

- $\overline{P_{g,i}}(t)$: maximum (positive) power from the grid
- $P_{g,i}(t)$: power from the grid under baseline operation

Energy Potential



Energy Potential


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- **Discharging (power) potential:**

$$V_{d,i}(t) \doteq \underline{P_{g,i}(t)} - P_{g,i}(t) \leq 0$$

- $\underline{P_{g,i}(t)}$: maximum (negative) power to the grid
- $P_{g,i}(t)$: power from the grid under normal operation

Energy Potential



Energy Potential

Energy potential or flexibility of a household i , for a time interval ΔT , is defined as the amount of energy that can be “*charged*” to or “*discharged*” from the household.

- **Example:** When the battery is currently *charging* with rate $c_i(t) \geq 0$, the charging (energy) potential is:

$$V_{c,i}(t) = \underbrace{c_{\max,i} \cdot \min\{\Delta T_{c,i}^*(t), \Delta T\}}_{\text{maximum charging energy}} - \underbrace{c_i(t) \cdot \min\{\Delta T_{c,i}(t), \Delta T\}}_{\text{current charging energy}}$$

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
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Opportunity Costs




Opportunity Costs

Independently of the way that the BRP is currently utilizing the battery, the opportunity costs of activation can be defined as follows:

$$C_{act,i}(P'_{g,i}(t)) = \underbrace{U_{base,i}^*(t)}_{\text{optimal baseline operation}} - \underbrace{U_{BRP,i}(P'_{g,i}(t))}_{\text{BRP intervention}}$$

under the selected by the BRP power exchange with the grid.

Opportunity Costs (cont.)



Opportunity Costs: *Revenues under Baseline Operation*


What would have been the revenue when the user maximizes its own utility:

$$U_{\text{base},i}^*(t) = \max_{P_{g,i} \in [\underline{P}_{g,i}, \overline{P}_{g,i}]} U_{\text{base},i}(P_{g,i})$$

where

$$U_{\text{base},i}^*(P_{g,i}) \doteq U_{\text{e.sell},i}(P_{g,i}) + U_{\text{b.store},i}(P_{g,i}) - C_{\text{e.buy},i}(P_{g,i}) - C_{\text{b.loss},i}(P_{g,i}) - C_{\text{b.wear},i}(t)(P_{g,i}).$$

Opportunity Costs (cont.)




Opportunity Costs: *Revenues under BRP intervention*

What is the revenue of the household when the BRP intervenes:

$$U_{\text{BRP},i}(P'_{g,i}) = U_{\text{e.sell},i}(P'_{g,i}) + U_{\text{b.store},i}(P'_{g,i}) - C_{\text{e.buy},i}(P'_{g,i}) - C_{\text{b.loss},i}(P'_{g,i}) - C_{\text{b.wear},i}(P'_{g,i}),$$

Generic Activation Costs



Generic Activation Costs

The user submits a linear activation curve that values its own preferences over the use of the battery. For example, when the BRP wants to establish a positive imbalance:


$$C_{act,i}(t) = \alpha_i(t) \cdot V_{c,i}(t) \cdot \beta_{c,i}(t)$$

under the selected by the BRP power exchange with the grid, for some positive constant $\beta_i(t)$ and activation parameter $\alpha_i(t) \in [0, 1]$.

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Generic Activation Costs



Market Participation

We need to compute the optimal subset of participants and their schedules to generate a specific commitment $E(t) > 0$ at time interval t . In the case of generic costs,


$$\begin{array}{ll}\min & \mathbf{z}_c(t)^T \mathbf{a} \\ \text{s.t.} & V_c(t)^T \mathbf{a} = E(t) \\ \text{var.} & \mathbf{a} \in [0, 1]^N\end{array}$$

Market Participation Optimization (cont.)

Optimal activation for $E(t) > 0$

```
1: procedure OPTIMALACTIVATION( $V_c, \mathbf{z}_c, E(t)$ )
2:   order participants  $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$  as follows
    $\beta_{c,1} \leq \beta_{c,2} \leq \dots \leq \beta_{c,N}$ 
3:   for  $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$  do
4:     if  $i \leq k^*$  then
5:        $\alpha_i^* = 1$ 
6:     else
7:       if  $i = k^* + 1$  then
8:          $\alpha_i^* = \left( E(t) - \sum_{j=1}^{i-1} V_{c,j} \right) / V_{c,i}$ 
9:       else
10:         $\alpha_i^* = 0$ 
11:   return  $\mathbf{a}^*$ 
```

Imbalance Optimization



Market Participation

We need to compute the optimal subset of participants to minimize a current imbalance, say $\Delta_{BG} > 0$

$$\begin{array}{ll} \min & -\mathbf{z}_d(t)^T \mathbf{a} + \lambda_{imb}(t) (\Delta_{BG}(t) + V_{d,i}(t)^T \mathbf{a}) \\ \text{var.} & \mathbf{a} \in [0, 1]^N \end{array}$$

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Summary

Summary:

- We described a framework for *activation optimization* in balance groups.
- Essential building blocks:
 - energy potential calculation
 - opportunity/activation costs
- *Recall:* This is an optimization that applies to single interval ΔT .

Future Work:

- Day-ahead optimization for spot-market participation
- Upcoming paper in DACH+ Energy Informatics 2019

Snap-shot of Day-ahead Optimization

